Lisa Tessman Editor Feminist Ethics and Social and Political Philosophy: Theorizing the Non-Ideal 6 Springer Chapter ll Practicing Imperfect Forgiveness Abst act Forgileness is typically rega.dcd as a good thin8 even a vinue but acrs of forsileness can vary widely in value, depending on $eir conrcxr and motilarion. Faced with this variation, philosophers have lended lo reinlorce everyda) concepts of forgiveness with slricl sels ofconditions, crcating ideals or paradigms of forgiveness. These are mcant to dislinguish good or praiscworthy instances o1 forgivcness from problematic instances and, in panicular, to pftnecr the sclf-respecl ofwould-be forgivers. But pffadigmadc foryiveness is problcmatic fora number of reasons, including ils inauention ro forgaveness as a gendcred lrait. Wecm accounr for fte values and thc risks associated wilh forgiving far bcrtcr ifwe trear it as moral pmcrice and not an idcal. Keyworals Fo.givencss Resentment Self respecl . Gendered ! inue Feminisrn 11.1 The Value(s) of Forgiveness Forgiveness has enjoy€d !n unprecedented surge of academic cnlhusiasm in the last few decad€s. We have lcarned that forgiveness is grrcd lor your hcalth (Thoreson et al. 2000), good for your busincss (Kurzinski 1998), good for your intimate relationships (Colenan 198), dd good for your polirics (Shriver lSg5, Turu l99g, ArnsruD 2005). Accordi'g to seveml religious lradirions, forgiveness is also gmd for your erernal soril. From clinical psychologisls and d€m()cralic reformers to spiritual gurus and yoSa teachers, a surprising numb€r of authorities are suddenly counseling individuals lhal $cy can and even or8rr to forgivc. Despite the panoply ol benenb now associated with it, leminists may have reasons !o regard an ethics of fbrgiveness .athe. wdrily. Allcr all, this spare offorgileness promotion has lbllowed relatively quickly on ihc hccls of s€vcral significant D.pfirftntotPhilosophy, York Uniw6ity, 5418, RGsBoildi.S, 4700 Keete Sftet, Toromo, ON. M3J , Fl, Cdrda e-mail: anacla@yorLu.ca r86 liberarcry movemenrs. including the civil rights movement. second wave feminism, and lhe rise ol queer politics. One would be fbrgiven (pardon the pun) for noting, as Janicc Haaken does somewhat dryly thatjust when 'oppressed groups gain the snenglh to speak up and claim new rights, including the right to disengage frorn abusive rclationships. the powertul rediscover the salutary vntue of forgiveness' (2002, I84). At the very least, it is worth asking certain questions. mosl nolably: whar, exactly. is being advocated, when women arc exhorted to forgivel Second, in praising ibrgiveness, whal alternadves ro forgiving do we Lhereby cririque? Some lear thal in tb.gi!ing widely, we waive a raluable fbrm olmoral (and poUtical) pro€st. Olhers worry thar the new erhics of tbrgiveress masks a more lamiliar and oppressive paradigm in which women. in particular, are laught lhe values ofseh-sacrifice and servility. or concern tbr olhers al the expense oftheir own rights. Given the gen' dered hisbry of rhese supposed virtues. the dange.s of a new duty to forgive may appear particularly acute from a feminisl perspective. At the same time the intuitiveappeal oflbrgiven€ss is based on a vision olmoral litt thal goes beyond formal duties and obligations 10 otherc. and which imbues rclalionships as well as dghts with value and significance. Forgiveness recognizes human imperfection drd our capacity for change and improvemenl. wben we forgive. wc at least atlempl to engage in moral repairi that is, to restore and revitalize moral relations between individuals in lhe atiermath ofwrong, |alher lhan to sever them (walker 2006). This vision of r€pair is far from an anti-feminisl vision. In odrer words, tbrgiveness may not be something we need eiih€r to promote or reject absolutely. The problem-or problems-wi1h forgiveness arise from the simple fact Ihat, at leasr according 10 many ordinary language uses ofthe term. we can forgive in a wide ran8e ofcircumstances and for a widc range ofrea$ns. Some ofthese cir cumstancos and rcasons arc beucr (c.g. saicr. Drore defensible, mo.e self respccdng, more obviorlsly ,nr.rl) rhan others. That many acts ol fbrgiveness, a1 least tbr the rime bcing, musr lake place in conrexts of uneven and otlen !njust power dynamics only serves to underscore rhe point. Faced with the unsurprising observation rhar acis of forgiveness vary in value, philosophe.s of iorgiveness have respondcd by calling for (theoredcal) reinlorce' ments. Clearly. forgiveness ought to be a moral action, they claim: not merely in the sense thal ir is open to moral evaluation and may hold moral significance, but moral in the sense of morally goo4 or praiseworthy. The lariable moral valuc of our actual praclices of forgiveness is therefore in need of fteorerical clari6cation. Dividing themselves into 'boostels' and 'debunkers' of forgiveness (Murphy 2003), philosophers have, for the most part, either concentrated on shaping tbqive' ness into a rarionally defensible moral ideal or have used exainples ol poor. risky and seemingly immoral forgiveness lo unde.mine the polential value of forgiveness altogelher. This has led lo a narrow and often unhelplul set of dichohmics nnd opposirions, which together liame the philosophical discoursc on folgive ncss: eilhcr we resent wrongs or we lbrgive theni either forgiveness is conditional on rhe wongdoer's repentance or ir is enrhely ll']conditioned; eirher forgiveness emerges from a robust sense of self-respect or it is servile condonalion: either tbrgileness matches or at least resembles a philosophical paradigm and is I I PEcricirg IDpcriccr Foryiveness t87 therefore genuine and praiseworlhy, or it is imperlect, immora!, or even 'pseudo ln this paper, I wanl to explore how we might go about theorizing forgiveness. if we begin by reiecting thosc dichotomies and the piclure of forgiveness as a nomarive ideal tiom wbich they arise. I do this lor severrl reasons: fi.st. I see the ettbrt to articulate the periect paradignr olmoral lbrgivcncss as a doomed enrerprise. I ag.cc $rrh MJrgrrer Wrl*er rnJr ir h Lnlr[(l] Ihdr rhrr. ,s ".rnple c^nrcr rJrr ol ..{ giveness, in rhc way that there is a correcr theory of the st.ucture oi DNA' (2006. 152). Moreovcr, searching fbrsuch a fteory may be dangerous as wellas fulilc, iiil prevenls us from attendiog to actual practices of {brgir'eness and fie naratives lold by those who do (ordo noO iorgive, in circunstances and lbr reasons not contained by philosopbical pamdigms. Il, as I suggesr, thc ncgleded narralives are most ofrcn those belonging to members ofoppressed or subordinate social groups, this neglect is particularly worrying. Finally, in absrracting lrom the messy details oftbrgivencss as a practicc, philosopbical paradigms oftbrgiveness display some ofwhat Charles Mills calls the vices ol idcal Lheory (Mills 2004, 166). I focus in panicular on the role ofgcnde. in philosophicaldiscussions ol fb€iveness: fie problemalic absencc (and presence) ofgender in phik)sophical paradigns and examples, and tbc ways in which iorgiveness is implicirly gendcred' bolh in a(ributions and in expechrions.l I make my argumenl in firee sugcs: firsl I olter a wide accounr oi forgileness and contmst i1wi1h narow philosophical pradigms. Second. I cons ide. forgiveness $ a poLentially gendered concepl, and dcmonsirate how ideals ot lorgiveness may reinforce problematic gendcr assumptions. Finally, l consider what it might mean to theorize non-ideal io.giveness, rhrcugh an extendcd mcditalion on a sho( passage on women and tbrgiveness in Dostoyevsky. 11.2 Whaf Does (or Should) Forgiveness Mean? I understand forgivencss first and lbremost as an evem or a 'happening': someone lbrgivesi someone else is fbrgiven. Insolar as lbrgiveness is deliberative, ir is also an actionrsomething we do, or ar leasr aim to do. Olcourse. 'forgiveness'may also describe our disposition to pcrform acts oi forgiveness (or indeed, il io.giveness is a virtue. to pcrlbrn rhem well): Robefls and Criswold have nicknamcd this trait 'tbrgivingness' while David Novitz speaks ofwhat it is ro b? forgiving'(1995, 2007, I 998). Forgiveness is whar tbrgivingness doesFin:rlly. ;f acts ol iorgiveness do €xpress impo ant ideals, we conld reLr to thesc ideals, roo, as tirrgiveness. Bur lbrgiveness qra idealand forgiveness 4ua virlue borh depend upon fteact itseli: the transformadon we intend in utlering phrases like'I tbrgive you.' Whar do we do when we forgive? Most philosophen agree (har lorgiveness is a pe.rorml(rather than an institutionalor oflicial) responsc to wrongfulharm.It is also a generous or liberalreactioniaca offorgiveness mark adeliberate shitt from away fiom a negative stance toward the wrongdoer or in some cases, the immediate substilution ola positive stance tbr lhe expected negative on€, in the 6rst place This shift in stance does nor dittuse o. ignore the wrongness of rhe oltense: lbrgivencss 188 confronts wrongdoing for whd it is, and does not ry to explaio it away While efforb to torgive may resemble cxcuses or justi6cations. ,niculatitrg a decision lo forgive inclGs fte moredimcult task ofaccounting simultaneously for whv hostilitv might be iustified and our willingncss lo forgo or rethink il 1am excused ifI am less blamcwonhy for my aclion, but I am forgiven /or my blam€worthiness In everyday language. what we recognize as acts of lorgiveness are also lvpically charactetizcd by certain alliludes, riluals and beha!iors, perceplions and even utter€d phrases but lhese may change, dcpending on the indiv;duals involved' the relatbn;hip betwecn ihem, and the naturc ol $e offense.In some friendships much is conl,eyed non-vcrballyia single gesture may convey apology and its acccptan'e' ID other;elationships, words are a/l that is needed for both panies lo acccpt tba! for givencss has ranspired. Cenainly, aileast (hefollowing cases are possible examples ofwha( we mishr ordinarily refer lo as an act olibrgivencss: (i) Ov€rcoming initialleelings ofrage, resenlmcnt and anger' ( ii) Coming ro believe the wrongdoe. is polentiallv more than the sum ofher acir (iii) Tacitly or erpticirly Siving herpcrmission lo srop assessing herselfmorally in lerms of thd one act. (iv) Purposcfulty refraining from any relaliating behavior (including verbal (v) Articulaling words of torgiveness, or participaling in some equivnlenl ritual' wirh sincerity and Sood inlentions- (vi) Sincercly accepting an apology (vii) Moving on lo a ncw. positi!€ relationship, following a breach of rhe old bv wrongdoing. Nol every possible way of characterizing forgiveness is lisled here of colrsc. Thc list is mc;nt 10 be chalacieristic. noi exhaust;veMoreov€r. performing onc 01' $cse aclrons in any particular siluation would not guarantec lbrgiveness: in a long_ standing, complcx tamily rctationship marked by disrust on bolh srdes words of forgiveness alone might bc deeply unsa(isiving lor all corccrned ln a morc casual or iormat rclationship, on the othcr hand, talk otovercoming 'age and hatred mighl actually exaggcrate and lossilize hosdlities, rather than t'ansform ihcm. especially if the wrong in qucslion was rclarivelv ninor (Bolevn-Filzgerald 2002) Bul we can cenainly imaginc lhat, in thc absencc ol reasons to ftink orherwise, tx-oPle who pcrlbrmed one of these actions might t*e rhemselves to have forgilen and equaity, iI we wcre the recipients of such geslu.cs, w€ miSht understand ourselves to be tbrgiven. l'toreover. it seens to mc lhat il mall€rs wheher or nol lhose invollcd in an acl of forgiveness undershnd it as such: ir may even delermine wbelh€r or not the acl '..'nrs'. Here I rake issue with a recenl treahent of forgiveness' which begins wilh thc claim: 'forgiveness has nol t'een given or r€ceiYcd. simply because one b€lieves orfcelsrhal ithas been... rcgardless ofthe tevet of subjeclive conviction' (criswold 2007, xv). True, we can imaginc cases where indiYidualsare misaken ordeluded in I I Practicins Inperfat Forsivenc$ thinking they have forgiven but acts of forgivcncss also s€€ms lo funcdon symbol ically wilhin a particular .elationship. We cannor dcpcnd entirely on s€lf-rcporting perhaps bur equally wc cannol enrirely cash out lhe enlire rncaning ofany act o forgiveness in advance, any more than a disintcrcstcd obscrver can apprecialeelerl gesture of love or apology, dislrusl or gradtudc, lrom the outsideWc must also ir cach case determine what il means to thc lorgiver and forgiven, by paying allentio! to how the concept is used by those in snu (O'Shaughness! 196?). Second, I disagree wift the dominant assumption among pbilosophers that 'for giveness is primarily a matlcr of how I ./€el aboul you (nol how I treat you)' (Mur phy and Hampton 1988, 2l). Wharever clsc lbrgivcness may enrail, rhey argue, il musl aL lcast involve a change in atlitudel the dclibclativ€ eflon b olercome war ranbd .esentmenl and hostilily. undcrlakcn only l'or a prescribed scl of moralb acceplable reasons. Virtuous o. ideal forgi\'cness is corlrional on one or morc oi thcsc rcrsons most oflen, the wrongdoer s wholchca(ed and informed repenrance Why rhe obsession with rcsentmenr? When philosophcrs take up fie qucsrion ol tbrgivcness, lheydo so primarily ro probl€matizc its moralvalue, mosroften in rela. tion to smndards ofjustic€ and s€lf-respecl (Murphy 1988, Novilz 1998, Hieronymi 20Ol)In tailing to object sulllcienlly, some argue. the forSiving viclim appears rc condone and cven collude;n her own wronSdoing. She docs not demonsrrarc appro, priate self-respcct. Anicularing and promoting forSiveness may also undermine and diminish fie potential moral insights of our 'neSative' rcactiors lo harm such as anger, resenhcnt and blame (Boss 1997, Poler 2001, Quinn 2004). Since ft€ puF pos€ of$cseenotions is (i) moralproresr and (ii) moral self'dctenle, rhey andnor the tendency to forgive are priaa lacie \itt)ous rcsponscs !o wrong (Murphy 1988, Brudholm 2m8). All thc therapcutic, physioloSical, straGgic and political benenrs of forgiveness musr lake second place lo lhir protest. Only resentmcnt can geL th€ moraljob done. Moreover sincc forgiveness h a normalive concept, they argue, (i) forgiveneiSmust b. premised on prior resentment and (ii) factors that promorc and prolect norms ofiusrice and sclfrespect must eirhfi be 'wri cn in' to whal counts as genu'ne forgivencss, or ldded as warraniing condilions lbr successful (genuine. legirimatc, p.aiseworthy, etc.) occasions oi it. Undcrslanding ideal or paradigmaric tbrgivcncs$ is simply a matter ofderernrining the appxrpriate ser ofconditions.2 I see this lbcus on thc cmotionaldimcnsion oiibrgivencss ds problemaric fo.two reasons. First, it risks excluding or undennining fte ritualistic, behavioral and €ven pragmatic elements ol forgiven€ss; lo fte pcrson being lbrgiven, how she is treaFd by the forgiver may be ial more important than Murphy allows. B€ing 'let back ir' may be as much a malrer of social gesture as it is a malter of deep emolional rransformadon. Second, Murphy and those who iollow him lend ro idealize and oversimplify resentmenr, allowing ir todo alllhc moralheavy liftingin the afrermarh Murphy understands r€s€nrmenr almost cntirely in rerms of moral proresr. In doing so, he follows Rawls, who dcllncs rescnrmcnr as a moral feeling lhal invokes rhe concepr of righr' (1987,533). Res€nhcm is 8orxj. because il is clearly and unproblematically tied to 'a non-conrovcrsially Sood thangelf-resp€cf (Murphy 1988, l6). This philosophical defi nition of rcsentmenr is narower ftan our common i90 usage and that is no1 necessarily a bad thing. The dilncuhy is that Murphy shifts bcLween common underslandings ot' resenhenr (we naturally resent iniurics) and Rawls' philosophical accounl (our resentmenL necessarily carries a morally robust claim). Forexanrple, Murphy moles tooquickly from the fact that someone protesrs an injury to $e assumption thal her protesl must be grounded in a robusr sensc oi her own proper value, rather than say lear, need or desperation. Resentmenl does not always and only express self'respect; people with deficienr or absent selfrespect may still resent harms and wrongs. Second, daily resenhents are often lied to far less impressive norms rhan the concepr of(moral) 'righf. We resent t-ailures of good manners, ofreciprocal social convenlions, evcn as Margaret Walker notes offasbion. like p€culiar hai.curs (2006, l2,l). Walker remains mo.e laithtul ro common usage than Murphy does. when she claims reseniment is an emotional weapon employed in rhe tace of threars to any nunber ol cherished norms ( 128). The emotioral phenomenolo8y of rcsentment is the same in each crsei our angry tbelings represenl a desire a denand - (har $c lansgressor ol somc norm be held accountable to that norm. $at she be mdlc to acknowledge i1s force, ro regrel her violrtion. In othcr words, resenhent continues lo behave as a r ctive auiludc (Strrwson 1993) whether lhe nolm in queslion is strictly moral, social or customary. Some reseotmenrs are cases olrighteous indig naiion: otheN emcrge tiom envy and insecurity. disgusr and disdain. Pcoplc can resent the eflba 10 use inclusive languagc. renovations b older buildings to crca1e acccssible spaces, or a gay pride parade marching down lbek street. Thus, rcsentmcn! responds to the violation of norms but nor all norns are cre ated equal. When we limil use of the term to instances where it is deployed to defend uncontrolcrsial moral concepts, we risk seriously over-moralizing resenlment (Walker, 127). This is not to discre4it icscntmenr enlirclyi it may well exprcss moral prolest, as well as tunction as a witness lo wrong, or nn enorional rcllsal to accept the i-act of iniusrice. Ir nay also express tear. insecuriry, misguided cnti tlemenl, or atlachnent to probl€malic, exclusionary norms. A plausible accounr ol resenimenl muslrecognize both possibilities. InsGad of relying on resenlmenr to determine wherhcr and whcn lirgiveness is w3rranted, we might examinc lypical acts of lorgiveness for what they tcll us about rhe relation, o. changc in relarion, between the lbrgiver and forgilen. Tberc are good reasons to lbcus on whal forgiveness prcduces as a potenljal source o{ its value, and not me.ely on what il overcomes or erases. Claudia Card describes our abiliry to forgive as a moral power,' capable of achi€ving something of moral s ign ilicance (2002, 173). For Card. this achievement is the abilily 10 cope with the moral remainders ofwrong: sufibring, guilt altd regrer. Hannah Arendr puts it another way: forgiveness f.eer' the wrongdoer, by releasing her frorn lhe woNt consequences of her wrcns (1958. 237). FoBiveness is meanr as, kind of /d/l€l walker chamcterizes ih€ restorxlive properties of forgiveness sUghtly ditferentlyi she lbcuser on /epdn-rather rhan release (2006). Card, Walker and Arendt all emphasize raNard kDking values ol hop! and trust in others, rhe pi:sumprion olgoodwill and rcspccr, and the desire to rcst{)€ and improve relaLionships. To the extent that forgiveness ir backward-looking, noreover. the forgiver may concern herselfas much with the I I Practicins Imperiect Forgiveness brcach of a valuable relationship as she does with potenlial injuries to her selfrespecl. In other wo.ds, I suggest that we forsake a singular ideal of forgiveness and redirecr our atlenlion outwards in two waysi 6rst. io recognizing fie variety ofways in which people may forgive, and the wide range of expressions thaL fo.giveness may take. Sccond, I suggest we focus on lbrgiveness or 'forgivenesseJ as a set of non hostle practices for negotiating wrongdoing that may express a nl!,nrer of reparative aims: relief, release or rcconciliation. We ought to rc orient ourselves away from the highesl ideal and down lo the ftreshold offorgiveness. To those schooled in the philosophical discourse on forgiveness, il migbt appear as though I have simply presented an incomplete catalogue oi usages lamiliar to ,r€, and not a philosophical account. Ordinary languagc is a far from unproblematic methodology, ofcourset what is 'ordinary' to nre, in my cukure, class and circumslances. may bc far from ordinary to you. In lac1. i1 is precisely,"cadt usages vary so widely, and in relation to variables ofcuhure. gendcr, race, class and hislorical epoch, thal we ought Lo pay aitention to ihen. Acls of tbrgiveness respond to two veryconcrete and immediate things: thc offense ilsell and th€ wrongdoer who com mitled it.It is hardly surprisjng thar the meaning and phenomenology of forgiveness will vary as widely as wrongs and wrongdoers do; providing an exhaustiv€ accounl is probably beyond the reach of the almchair philosopher Bui this is no1 to say we cannot make headway.In lhe following section,I considerone ptoblemalic variablei gender I 1.3 Gendered Forgiveness Understanding torgiveness as amoral practice requires that we undersland ir asgen dered, arnolg-other things. Men and women are encouraged lo express their gen_ der in a number ofwaysi these expressions vary across social classes and cultu.es. and can change over time. The categories of'masculine' and 'feminine' identify a shifting conplex of trails. behaviors, inages and social expectations. Cender is also expressed ihrough moral norms. For example, Calipbell notes thar many of our virtue and vic€ terms are gendered (Campbell 1994). Since gender concep(s are 'persistent and powerful organizing categories of ihought,' it is hardly surpns' ing that some ofour moral ideals are also gender ideals (Nodock 2009, l3). when a vico or viriue term is gendered, itdoes not praise or censure uniformly: the same trail may be praised in women and criticized in men. Campbell describes the'Kanlian feninine'as an ideal ofemotional sensitivity and sentimentality: sympa$elic. del icarc, compassionate and eNily oftended (1994, 56). These same tmits applied 10 a man ofKanfs tilne or ours would not be unambiguously flattering. The 'Kandan feminine' also calls to mind virginia woolf's specter of'The Angel io the House': She was inrensely sympathelic. She was immensdly charning. She sas ullerly unselfish She excelled in the diificull artsoffamily liie. She saclificcd hcNeltdaily... in shon she was so con$ituted ihar she never had a nind oi a wish of her own, but piefefted to sympalhirc always wilh the ninds and wisbes ofoters. Abole all I noed not say it she {as put. (woolf 2008) 192 As moral exemplars go. the Angel in lhe House is rot parlicularly cmpowering. one iscrpccted to admirc her for whal she suffers and rtceives, nol what she dr€r or achicvcs. Her virruc Iies in her own sclf-effacemenl: she is an exemplary moralagent by hardly acring al all. Evenlually, Woolfconclud€s, lhe Angel must b€ el'minated: I turncd upon her.ndcaughr hcr by the lhrcar I did ny ben to killher My cxcuse, iilwero robchddupinacourtothw,souldberhltlloredinselfdcfcnsc.Hidlnorkilhdh she world hrv€ kilhd me. {woolr2008) Since the hisrory ofgender is also ! history of gender opprcssion, leminisrs have good reason to be critical ofgendered virlues: lhe feminine virtues we.e also. traditionally, cxacdy rhose traits lhat suppos€dly rendered women unfit for the public sphere and for political power As Claudia Card not€s, oppre.ssive sftial conditions crn recasl and disguise moml damage and survival strategies wilh lhe honorific of '!irtuc' (C0rd 1996. 53). ofcourse. r sur!ival strategy is not necessar;ly a wholly barl thing, cither, insolar as u achicves just thari su.vival of its bearer under inhos pilablc conditions. Id€ntitying a practice or trait as ieminine does not require that we rcicct il allogerher (not all Angcls nced killing). but il does ale[ us to ask row. as a Bendercd term. il is empbyed and exactly what vision ol good' it apPars lo k forgiveness a gendered cooccpt? For some, torgiveness is mosl at home in the Chrisrian rcligious tr.dition, which counsels that ?ve,fore, male or female, ought ro lbrgivc. U ev€ryone faces a similar cxpeclarion to toryive, cenainly, forgiveness is xor gondercd or at leasr. not explicitly. Bul even wilhin a Christian contexi of univcrsally advocated unconditional tbr!iven€ss, lhe story is not so simple. Judith Boss norcs Lhar normalive uses ol tbrgivcness by Chrislian institutions Lcus on ibrgiv€nc$s in tamilies, including abusivc and violent familics. Civen lhe dccidedly gendercd nalure of domeslic violenco, Boss asserts, discussions of forgiveness cannot bc leparated from gendet politics' (Boss 19S7, 235). As long as ibrgiveness is advocdcd pdmarily 1o suslain abusivcand oppressive rela(ionships, its value can' nor b€ separaled fron $e gendered violcnce it enablcs (I-amb 2002). In other words, rhe obiects and focus of forgiveness may be gendered. Funhctmore, both Boss and Anca Ghcaus remind us lhal lhe Chrislian argument for lbrgiveness is premis€d on univcrsal lallibility and moral frailty we lbryive orhers because we ourselves are also sinncrs. and in need ol God s forgivcness a remark chillingly reninisc€n1ofa bn8 tradirion of victim-blam ing, in contexls ofdonestic and sexual violence (Boss 1997, Cheaus 2009). Gheaus nores that acco!ding to Chrisrian lheologian Paul Fid d.s, in human rulrtionships no onc is an innocent parly. There arc several go(d rcasoos rc bclicve that forgivcncss is Sendered or, at leasr, lhat forgiveness as we undcrshnd il emerges from a profoundly gendered his1ory. Ceruinly, 'forgivingness' or lhe disposition Io forgive appcars at home wilh orher 'solr' arrributes tradnionally coded as feminine: palience, carc, and sympa fietic undcrstanding. Indeed, il is cxactly these aspecrs of forgiveness: that it is tm soli, roo yiclding, too self-sacrificing, and lails toconfront othcrs appropriately. rhar moli!'are many oflhe philosophrcal ohiections to forgiveness raised by Murphy .rnd othcrs. Hann$ Arendl notcs lh{l tbrgiveness has been relegltcd to the pilatc, I I P.acticing lnlperlccL Forgireness raftcr lhtn prhlic realm jusl as women wcrc in parl becalse ol rhe ckxe arx) ciation bcrween lbrgiveness and love ( 1958. 243). Ifrhe idealwoman is rcsponsible for maintaining relarionships and for kccping dom€stic hamony, forgiveness will regularly bc required of her. In cha.acterizing the ideal woman. forgivingness has also lunctioned as a tool for silcncing hcr more assertive counterparts. Sociery is tar quicker to castigate and ro label the woman who will nol lugivc as ungry, biuei or shrewish lhan her malc counterpa( I phenomenon witncsscd mosl recently in Hilary Clinton's campaign lbr the Democratic presidential nominarion. Media comnEntarors have remarked thaL despirc her formidable legislative and polilical record, the single acl lhal !em, porarily kepl Clinlon's campaign afloar was her willingness lo forgivc her hrsbandi that single aclion redeemed her femininny sufiiciently for middle Amcrica. Sev, eral rccent srudies in emp'rical psychology halc indicated thar willingncss to forgi\e divides along g€nd€r lines. and womcn are more inclined m lorgive lhan men (Exline et al. 2008. Toussainr and Wobb 2005).4 Exline.emarks that thc sex difl-ercnces they uncovered wer€ surprising und unexpecled (Exline er aI..2008). Of course, rhose ol Lrs unwilling to acccpt gcndcr dichotomies as essenrial lnay casr a critical cyc ovcr these studies, bul rhey reinlbrcc whal feminisrs have hng arguedt in contemporary western societ), womcn urc more likely to be socializcd to culti vate empa(hy and oarc, to sublimnE their needs and dgha to tholc ol an ongoing relalionship. and ro rejecl negarive emotions ofang€r and resenrmcnl.s lr makes sense rhal an inclinalion lo forgivc or a srnse ofits expectarion mighl be part of this socializarion. Given rhis social prussurc. and rhe hisroricalassociarion berweer ibrgi!eness and s(rne culturally cncodcd sci oi'essenlial teminine characteristics, women nray havc additlonalreasons ror () lbrgi!c, or ro resist renrS brgiving. Murphy bcgins his diatribe againsr tirgiveness with ! quote f.om leininist autho. Fay Wcldon: 'undcrsiand and Iorgive, my mothcr said. and the effofl hasquitcexhausled mc' (Wcldoir 1988,5). Rather Ihan nking up rhc practice. many women may be inrcrested ir leaving it b€hind. Finally,I would suggesr that nolonly is our inherned concepr of lbrgivcness gendered, bd lhe philosophical discoune on lbrgivenessand rhe paradigms ir8cncrares are, ls well. Who forgives, in philosophical cxamples? For the mosl pan. phalosophc.s wriring on lbrgiveness illuslrate rhcir clains wirh whar I think oi a! 'Smiih and Joncs' cas$i the ligures remain shadowy, idcnti6ed only by the lerrcrs 'A and 'B' (Downic 1965, Harley 1991) or by singlc mrlc, Ango-Saxon nlmcsi 'Fred and Ralph (Kolnai 1973) Smiih and Robinson' (Benn 1996), 'Als$n and Benneu' (Haber l99l). Jcrryand Paul'(Boleyn-Fitzgcrald 2002)orindeed. remain nameless but nelcrrholcss male (Bennen 2003).6 These forgivcrs rend ro be colleagucs, busi ness pann€rs. or casual friends: they lbrgive after they fail 10 collaboratc appropriarely on shared projecrs, break pmmiJics or conrracrs, and forger ro repay bomowed money. In other \rords. they behave vcry much like lhe (male) herols ol classical liberal thcoryrautonomous. independ€nr, uiomisric agenrs, who dcliberrtely choosc to engage in sharcd proiecls for mu lual bcnclit ard advantage. Criswold cofirments. almost in pas$in8, lhat rhe conscnsus against ihird-pafty ibryiveness is promised, in part on prcsLrnubl) non-conlro!ersial conrmon scnse moral individunlism. wheLc 194 indiliduals arc undersrood to be atomistic moral uni$ (Griswold 2007, I l8). Yel this assumption ignores several decades ofwork in feminist theory, which has introduced, critiqued and revisql the insigh Ihai our agcncy as individuals is often con sliruled,at least in pan, by our rnost meaningful(and ofien unchoscn) relationships. The poinl is nol lo devalue autonony or individualily, but rather, to relhinkexactly in what these values consist. When women do appear in thc literalure on fotgileness, lhey lend todo so in onc oltwo guisesi first as $e abused wifc or viclim olslxual violence (Holmgrcn 1993, Boss 1997. Haber 1998. Murphy 2003). lntercslingly. these examples are always invoked :rs the quintessential case of prcblcmatic, disingcnuous or even pr"dlrtorgivcnessr they are deslined to fail because, clearly, such women cannol possi_ bly forgi're and meanwhile possess (let alone cxprest seli'rcspect. Second, women appearasthe motherwhose agency is so deeply idcnti6ed with herchild that she can tbrgivcas him -1he apparenr cou nleFexamplc lo tle common-sense moral individualism' that preven$ (hird-pany forgiveness. MoLhcrandchildare theexccplion thai prcvcs the rule, apparently, becausc the molher's agency is indistinguishable tiom rhe child. She is so psychologically altuned to hcr carinS relalionship lhal she may nol bea separare sclf ar all (Murphy 1988. Hablr I99l) Why consider this paucity of female cxamples anything more ftan an unfortunare f:rilure ofimagination? Among the polenlial v ices ot ideal lheory, according to Charles Mills, are its misrcprescmarions of social onlologies and of moral capacilics (Mills 20(X, 166). Examples matrcr because thcy rcveal lhe subjects of a particular rhcoryi ro whom exactly it is meanl lo apply, and what sorl of people they are. Here philosophical theories of tbrgiveness iall down on rwo accounls: first, in negl€cting women as lorgivers for the mosr part and second, in inlroducing fiem only to demonsraie ,ad forgiveness, or lbrgiveness/,r olreff and not on behalf of ihem_ sclvcs. Insisting that victims ofwrong must already have regained their seli'respecl bclore $ey can rightfully forgile may also attributc 'compleiely unreaUstic capacitics' to them (Mills, 166). Fu.thc.more, gendcrcd cxamples work so well in the philosophical discourse because they fil the parudigms they 'llustraLc, suggesling lhri these loo are problematically ge.dcred. Ceouinely considering cases where sexisl subordinalion and gendered violence play a role is not simply a matler of staighlforwardly enumerating them, bul rather, oftaking care to refleat aod accounl for fte agency and the voice of wonen within them, not relyingon culiumltropes ofthc helpless batrcrcd woman or the fierc. and selfless mother. And while there may wcll e,(ist an uncasy tension betwe€n pmcrices of forgiveness and self-resp€cl. choosinS a particular (gendered) exp€ricnce as rypifying sclf-disrespecling forgiveness, $cn declarinS it illegitinale alrnosl by dcfinirion is a deeply problematic solution. I have ditliculry s€eing such a theoretical move as achieving anylhing except lur$er diminishing the agency of rhose women who do see themselves as forgi!ingi neithcr does such a move atbnd sumcicnrly to the reasons they offbr for rhcir decision. Women who da forgive in these circumstances oiten d€scribe a complicated moralcalculation, it which self-respecl is balanced against mearingful, cvcn constilutilc, noral relationships (Flanigan 1999). I I Itracticinglmperiecr Forgiveness lr5 ls such a nanative a guaranrce l}Sainsr desperare or problemalic forgiveness? Oi course nor. bul il does nor nced to provide a guaranree, in order to be of value. For one fiing, aclually auendirg to viclim narratives may draw our alrenrion !o sophisricared 'adaptivc sratcgics' for n:Saaning agency and a s€nse of conrrol (Brison 1999, 218). The assumplion that victims who suffer froln diminished self-reipecr drc incapable of anything but passive erviliry is borh ?aronizing and inplausi blc; it misrepresenrs fie momlcapacilies ofthe individuals ir claims ro protecr. As Martha Minow purs ir, resroring dignily lo viclirns... should ar aminimum involve respecting rheir own responscs' (Minow 1999. 8). Instead of creating paradigms with self-respect wriuen in, phibsophers woulddo welltoalend to first person nar, ratives offorgiveness, and $e €xplanarions rhar accompany them. For one thing, in many cases, the lbrgilcfs seli-respect is not what has been damaged, but her trusL and good will for anolher. Accurarely undeKranding fie po(enrial lalue of forgileness, therefore, may rcquirc that we locus on its relarional asp€cts and this in turn draws our attenrion back to the rc tual relalionship in quesrion, in all its parriculariry, .tnd away from abstract paradigms or ideal cases ll.4 Imperfect Forgiveness How can we theorize forgiveness wilhoul ideals? This may involve lillle nore than Iooking carefully ar non-idealinstances of forgiveness. Philosophers may have much ro lem from empirical studies, firsr-hand r€pons_ and even lirerary accoun$ of how and why peopl€ forgive. Consider, for inslance. rhe p;crure of decidedly irrped€cr lbrgileness dcscribed in rhe following passage.laken from Dosroyevsky,s The Brcthers Karana?or. Dmitry KarAmazov (Mrlya) is explaining ro his younger brofier, Aloygha, why he will nol apobgize to his lover, Grushenka. When Aloysha suggests $at Grushenka would tbrgive him. Dmh.y lakes the opponuniry to teach hi\ lrrrle br^rhcr \.melhing of rhe relarion\hrp helseen $.ren ,nd me.t. and rhe kinds of lorgivcne\\ it engendersr: May lhe Lord prcscrvc you. my deurboy, from ev€rasking forgilcnes from a woDa. you love. ifyou happcn to trc rn lhe wrong, Fom I wonranyou loreespecially. yes espocja y. l{oNever nuch you nay bc in rhe srongl For a woman. ny dear fcltoq is rhe devit onl, knows whai erl oa a crcaru.c. I a nn cxpc on ftem, at an, nre! Bur rry to re , wom.n thil you r in lhe wrong l m sory. it s my frllt, forgive ne pleN, dd she l showq you enh eproaches! She ll ocvc. lorgive yo! tankl, and opnly. bur sitt hlmiliale yo! lo rhe la$ deg@, bring up things rhal ncler hap?encd. rcrcmber ewy hlb lhiog, tdget nolhing, add $rerhing of hc. ow., and only Oen witl she forgiv. yd. And $afs ho* tnc he$ ofrhem,lhe besr oI thcm. rilt bchave! ... A nan nu$ be nrsnanihous, a.d that wonlslainhisrepulatio.lftwonrerenslaintherdpu(ationofahco,notcvenotaCacsnrl But donl ever ask he. iorgilcn*s ior anything atl lhe sane. (Dosroyelsky 1958,69?) This passage could well be said lo rcpresenr everyrhing thal is worrying k) lbminisls abour discussions ol ibrgiveness. Nor onty are pejorarive gencralizalions madc abour women as a group (rhcy arc manipulaLive, cmasculating, emorional, rnd deceirful). but also a relalronship ol inequaliry and subrerluge bctween men and t96 women is advocaied explicitly (nren may tbryive onc ano$er, bul rhey musr dcny thch laults to women at all costs). Forgivcness enters the piclurc as one slralcgy tor mainraining or undcrmining thc appmpdately unequal rclarionship (Dmitry docs not have similar rescrvations about women asking men for lorgiveness; in these cases a man may bc magnanimous dnd gracious, in response). In the hands ol women, forgiveness is an unscrupulous and unjust poweri lo ask lbrgiveness is ro surrender power that ought nol (o be surrendcred. ForSivcncss is somcrhing tricky and somcwhat dishonesr,lhis passage suSSesK-J!.v lile rrrur?r.3 In othcr words, forgiv€ness is presented as a gendercd trait. Female ibrgiveness is problcmatized as deceittul rnd manipulativc, but ar thc same rime, women arc described as forgiving whilc men are,infnannrorr. The tbrmer has very diftercnt connorations lhan the laller. In Arislorle,lhc vinue ofmagnanimily is also ranslatcd as pride, and concerns irself wnh 'grcar honori' (1999, I 124a5). The magnanimous person isgracious and lenicnt wilh orhers because he can afford to be: his generosty emerg€s liom an abundance ol power, not the vuln€rabiliLy of victim ization. Unlikc tbrgiveness. which is premised on the idea rhat we are able ro hann and be harmed by one anofier, nagnan;miry is rootcd in srrength rnd imperviousness. Sloics such as Cicero and Scneca praised magnanimit! tbr rhis vc.y quality, llong with thc virrue ofm€rcy (Roick 2008, Serrcca 1995). ln laot, the truly magnanimous pcrson may hc incapablc of lillgileness, prccisely because of his impcr!iousnessi like Niclzsche's lbrgerful noble. he is not capable evcn ol recall;ng thc wrongs of olhers (Criswokl 2007, 8). The torgiving wonan is ar the samc rrme deeply rcsenti-ul, ind literally re livcs ('remembc.[s] every lirde thing . lorgelLsl nothing ) and re interprers rhe origin0l Mrng ('brin8lsl up thingi rha( neler h:lpPned , 'addfsl something of her own') as she rc rells ir. Nol onty is her forgiv.eness condilional condilion$ she appears intcnL on e.rrra.ri,e trom hcr untbnunate love. but. Dmilry implics, condilions appcar as if iom nowh€re and are added as shc goes along. On the orhcr hand, nulc magnanimity is .r trait oI the slrong. elen the heroicr abrndant, uncondirional and honesr Thc magnanimous man knows rhe rruth, riscs ahove rhc tiay, and ii llhnkl and lopenl abour it from rhe beginning. In other words, he is me.cihrl. There lre seleral oblious responses ro this passagei thc easiesr is pcrhaps lo debunk the gendcred generalization it makcs: that the charscter ofwomcn asa group jnclines rhem ro be mor€ rcscntful and less magnanimous than men.9 Ii my ana! ysis of gendercd forgivencss is correct, lhc opposile is likejy to bc rrue: womcn may have more rouble €xpressing ang€r, and l€ss trouble expressing empathy or care. Ofcourse, thc (fictional) women in Dostoyevsky's passage are not particulrrly paticnt. caring or empathclic: they display obsessivc rcsenhent, whose object is rheir wrongdo.r's grov€ling humilialion. Thc abiliry lo cmpathize and the rendency to resenl are nol incompaliblc: wc mighl even undersland rcsenrmenl as a naruml rcsponsc Lo excessivc expcctarions olcare, R€sentncnr as Dmiry dcscribes it is celrainly nor lhe noble sentiment describcd by Rawls and Murphy. Instead, rhe rcitcralion of wrongs naratcd by resenllul. forgiving-yet unforgiving women resemblcs resenlmcnt (or rassentime tl as Nierzschc saw it: d€ccprive, malicious, emotionally poisonous, and an invrluable I I Pradicins lmperfNt FoBivcncs t91 crcative.csource for those who are wcak. vulnerable, and lacking power (1967, 3?-39).10 Thcsc women re-narate the wrong, in all its shamefulness, cvcn as thcy claim to forgive it. Moreover, this imerprerive naffaiion is pan ofrhe poinr ofrheir forgiveness. Ralher than releasing rhc forgiven wrongdocr from the deeds of his past (Arendt 1958, 237). their forgiveness is designed in paft rc rcmind him ol them. Whatcver we may tbink ofDmilryt gender poliiics. rhc self rjghreous, guiltrnspifing for8ivene\\ hL des!nb(, r\ nor unismrlia. 11.5 Ambivalent Forgiveness Evidenlly, Dosrcyevsky's passage does nor deicribc an ideal case ol forgiveness. Whal exac y is wrong wirh the pid'rre Dmitry paints. according lo philosophical ideals offorgi!iflgl In the firsr place, rhe lbrgiveness expres$d is not a purc change of heani il is intenningled with and even consriruted by unresolved resenhenl Of course, ifrcsentment were necessarily a moral, self-respecting responsc to wrongs, then to rcscnt wrongs done is not necessarily a moral failing folhwinS Murphy and others, it would b€ a moral requirement bu1 then, as I argued abovc, resenlmentalso turns out to be nrorc complicarcd and less upriShtthan Murphy allows. We cannot always rely on its moral crcdibility. Dmitry's womcn rnayallo lail to exprcss the self r?spe.rir8 resenhenl Murphy cndorses. We lack texrual evidcnce ro dercr mine this absolutely this is not cruschenka's nanarive. afrer atl, bor Dmilri's but given the plcading and apparenlly duplicilous tone attribuod to lhem, it is at least plausible that lheir rescntmenr is grounded in fear and insecuriry, rathcr than a robust and measured sense of rhcir own value. Furthermore, in rhis passage, for givcness is a vehicle for resemmenr and not an anridore. Asany analyric phitosopher of lorgiv€ness will tell you, Benuine or vi uous forgiv€ness is meant to overcornc or cradicare iesenlment, not Lo disguise and exprcss ir. Insofar as rhe tbrgivcness in this passage finauy drpr mark an end to resenltul dcmands fbr an apology, il is unlimely delaydl. The contrite wronSdoer is (al lcasl in his own eyes) asked lo do too nruci. The forgiveness h€ finally rcc€ives is a hard,won r€spirc, and nol a gifi ar all. From the point ofview ofphilosophical ideals. at leasr, the scenc Dmirry paints is thus an apparent failure of forgiveness. Being forgiven in this way would feel ? whole lot like being blamed. ft is even whar we might call, fo owing J.L. Ausrin's framework, an abuse or misfirinS oi rhe pcrlormative uuerance .l forgive you'. Thc supposed fbrgiverfails to acconrplish thc moral rransfonnarion whe$cr conceivcd as release or reconciliation thar utleranccs ofthese words are neanr to enact. The resuh is unsatisfying for rhe recipienl, and unlikely to achieve fte almosl mimculous b€nefirs of forgiveness nenlioned at rhe beginning oflhis paper. Furthermore, at least according to Dmitry\ interpretation, rhis failurc is a failurc of character. rttributable lo lhe women themseives. Th€y arc 'dclil only knows whar sorr of a creaturc', afrer all, and lack lhe approprialc vlrue to perform acIs of magnanimi!y. rather than rcpressed resentmenrWom€n may urter words of forgiveness. bor rhey t98 P€rtormarives can fail for m:my rcisons, howevcr. Here fo8ivencss ha3 apparently fail€d (if it has failed) because the supposed forgivers are excessivcly and inapprcpriately rcsentiul. Atler all. Dmitry has acccplcd the need for apology he does not cven dispute tbar fbrgiveness is required; his warning to Aloysha is not !o ask ibrgivcness ofa woman, even if he is ih the wron8. Bur Dmitry does display an unspoken alsumption, even a scnse ofentitlement, that he himself is thc b€st judge of whar kindsofconridon arc rcquiredofhim. Whd fruslrates him is his unwilling padicipation in an ongoing process or dialogue. Whilc Dmilry would likc lo ult€r an apology ancl be don€ with ir, his panner in this dialogue wanls something more cxtensive; accountability as well as reconciliation. The mixture of forgiveness and resentment that emerges is her stralcgy for negotiating bolhWomen in l91h century Russia hved under gender ideals nol unlike ftose describcd by V;rginia Vr'ooll Under lhe influencc of lhe Orthodox Church, thc ima8c ofpiery, modesty and sclLdenyins enicc to lhe family and the unfonunate' rcpresented the culmination of feminine vinue (Bisha 2002). Perhaps even more than rn rhe contcmporary wcst, women werc socialized to express soft, yielding, temininc rrairs while rejecting so-call€d 'negarive' emotions ofprotest and dcmand. It seems plausible that tbey would be cncouraged rc cngage in forgivinS bchavior. perhaps more than their male counierparts. BUL notice, in Dmitry's narrativei being forgiven by women is an excruciating ordeal bccause lheir angry emotions are surprisingly overwhelning becausc they r€corr? ovcrwhelm'ng once forgiveness is requ€sred. lf rhe quesdon of forgivcness is avoidcd ahogelh€r, it appcaB, lemal€ anger rcmains undercontrol. Thc ques on oftbrgiveness enables, even prompts it. Wc can thus rcad Dmitry's women as grabbing the only opportunily available ro henr. R€scntful, ambivalent firgivencss is nor a failurc, bul a subversive sralegy ibr brlancing seemingly incornpatible moral demands. The oullawed cxpressions of prolest the need lo tell one's "n version ofthe story and hale il beheard, ro have one's hun amrmed and acknowledg€d, and Io have €xpressions of anger b! acknowledged as wananred and legilimate have b€en incorporated, even rru88led, inro rhe socially and morally acceptable process of iorgivcnoss. At the samc tirne, Dmitry allows, thosc women do fbrgivei 'and only then will shc forgive you'. Thc value offorgivcness as a reparative slrarc8y is not sacrificed absolutely to prolost. The women in Dosioyevsky\ passage are, quite simply, refusing $ choose betwecn mainlaining rclarcdness and p.olesling injustice. The ambilalent forgive ness thar emerges is an adaprive slmtcgy for negotiaring an impossible choice. Norc roo, thar Dmiry lbcuscs on foryiveness betwecn inrimat€s: 'from a wonan you k)vc especially.' Close, intcrpcrsonal relationships ol love are olten hosc leasr likely to be governed by norms oljustice and righrs-claims. The wohcn described havc consciously or unconsciously adopled emolional strategies ior ncgotiating iniusticc without exning the rclationship altog€th€r perhaps because thcy lack thrl oplion, or pe.haps because they are balancing ils value akrngside lheir emorional prore(. They demonstare an important insighr that philosophical paradigms ove ooki sometimes, forgiveness can cxi$ alonSside lingering res€nlmenr. Linda Ross Meyerdescribes al least one si(ualion in which fte $,ods, 'l forSive you, bur I'm (ill angry' arc noi a contmdiotionr the case ofparcnts dcaling wilh I I PBcricinA lnpcrlecr Forsiveness 199 children (2000, l52O). We can at least imagine fLrlly aduh examples of this kind ofcasc, in which the forgivcr might say 'I do torgive you, but bcar wirh me it's going lo take me some time $ ger past this. I hope you'll be palient,' or cascs whcn a lcss prescient iorgivcr forgives, then inadvertenrly exprcsses resenlmcnl !t a later dale. If she sincerely inrcnds lo forgile. and has made a genuinc effoa lo distance hersell rather $an cndorse her original angry srancei il scems almosr churlish ro ciaim rha( she has/dr'l?z/ ro lbrgive. Indeed, I expccr rhis parlicular cJ(pericncc ftcasional, surprising momenG of rccalcirranl resonlmenr is morc common lhan we might like to admit. Add to lhis a deeper layer olenrenched, deep-sefltd causes tbr angcr, such as ongoinS social iniustice and oppression, and it becornes almosr impossible 1c) read orpredict the moral compass' ol' indiv idual angry occasions. For those individuals who consi.tntly receive mess.rgcs that they deserve lesr trom soci ely, gnawing, undermining rescntment may be conshnlly presenl and may cithe. numhorinnarne the emotional prorc$ ofspeci6c. individual irjuries. Admirtingrhar forSivinS is sometimes comparible with at leasl vnnc minimald€ree ofconlinuing anger and rcscnrmenr means th.I mcmbers ofsocial groups who have good rcasons ro teel angry, may slill havc occasion genuinely to lbrgive.ll F{rgivencss can be arnbivalcnt and still bc rcal.l2 In my intcrprctarion ol Dostqelsky's passage, howcvcr. I havc gone one step Iuaher. Not only are forSivencss and Gone degree of) rDsenrmenl cornpaliblet in some cases, one may adually enable lhe othcr. Campbell no@s lhal in rhe absence of social uprake and acknowledgmenl, exprcssions of anger and resenrmenl may bc unrccognizable as such, even to their bea.c! (1994, 54). Ironically, rt may only bc through acccpicd pracrices oi ti4ivcncss rhar menrbcrs of subord inaled Sroups are evcn arlp ro become angry (wrth all rhe power and legitimacy conleycd by ftat word) lct akrne in the riSht wa), at rhe righr rine. and rowad !h€ right obiecrs, as in the casc of virtuous anger. At rhe sam€ ine, ariculating and €xprcssing anger may frcc i victim to forSive, should she so desire. Docs forgiveness nccessitate an (evenlual) end lo angry feclings? Nor necessarily. anymore than wc h c ro feel angry betbre we can fo.givc.ln lbrgiving. we commrl ourselves to 'movc past'fte wrong, and to repair whatcvcr damage we can. But nchher commihent precludes r€sidualdist st or fie emeryoncc ofa ncw and possibly distanr relationship ln other words, acls oftbrSiveness are.or always linear prcgre$ions away from resenrment and Lowards olll reconcilialtun bul rt is nol always clear lhar lhey r/101L:/ be so. Insrcad, we somelimes find f(ryiveness mixcd in with rcsenhent. Gheaus descrihcs this mixturc as rn emotional dialecrics' of rcsenlmunl aod lor givencss. perttclly captu.ing the back and l.onh phcnomenobgy ol thc conloluled emotional trajectory many ol uscxperience, in forSiving (2009).Instcad olconlrasring uncondilional. instanlancous lffgivcncss with conditional forgivenc$s, premiscd on a pre-o.daincd ser ofconditions thai havc aheady been achicved, wc can under sland thcsc aslimitcases. marking theouter limils ol! much widerrange olpossible Forgiveness ;s not always Ih! right stat€gy lbr dcmanding acknowledSment, of coursci $mctimes rhe rclusAl to lorgi!c is hr morc powcrtul, espccially when forgivcnei$ is cxpecred or cvcn $i,unred, is nr(nc clltctive.lr BuL in eithcr case. rhe 200 practice of granting, receiving and withholding tbrgivcness functions as a sphere in which wrongdoing is articulated and fo. which someone is made accountabl€: it makes nosenselo say, I iorgiveyou, andIrhink you did nothing wrong ,afterall ln some, iinol allc6scs, this sphcre is a promising a!enuc lbr neSotiating responsibility alongside reconciliation. Funhermore, the sottel and less rctribulive discou.sc ol forgiveness may make il available ro a wider range ofindividuals, includ;ne women and members of subordinaled groups who are socialized to avoid more aggressive forms of protest. Far from closing offavenues of accounlability, a discourse of forgiveness may even enable thcm. ll.6 Concluslons This papcr makes a preliminary case ibr trcaring ibrgivcness 6lst as a (porcnlially) valuablc sel of moral practices, rather than as a moral ideal ot scl of ideals Acls of tbrgiveness mny express virtues oi compassion, trus(, Sencrosity and wisdom Equally. they may bo p.obl€madcally unassuming, tailing lC) plotesi wrongdoing sufficiently or priorilizing the maintenance of moral)y dubious relalionships over self-respect. The panicular range of cases to which I have drawn attertion, in this paper are lhose acls of forgiveness that appear to be both valuable and problematic: their problemalic nalure does not dilutc the former, anymore than their value over_ comes rhe larler Negoliating how to assess or advocale acts of forgiveness requirus $al we look lo lhe particularilies oftheconGxl in which it occurs, m$er than impos_ ing a p.c-ordained s€t of ideals or conditions. Moreovcr, the conlcxl offorgilencss includes the broader polirical conlext oi Lhe wrong includinS, for example, lhe .ole ofgender polilics. The gcndered history of forgivcness as a moral concept may give women parlicular rcasons to be wary ofexhortations to forgive Finally. we should becarefulnotto ass!me lhar unproblematic or 'easy' cases of lorgiveness have more value than rncssy or 'imperfecf forgiveness thal is, value to the individual partic ipants, as well as value to the philosophers who sludy thcm. 'M€ssy' forgiveness rhar is. ambivalent, uncerlain and somelimes inconsistcnl strateSies ofrepair may promote th€ good wheo paradigmatic forgiveness is impossibleFunhermore' as the passage from Dostoyevsky demonstntes, morally complicaled foryiveness may rev€al insights notcaplured by paradiSnaric cas€s. Evcn slpposcd 'failures' of forgiveness nay revcal lhemsetves lo be sublle and soPhisticaled mcthods for balancing compering valuesolrespect, accountabilityandrcconciliathn Notes l. In this papc!.ldiscuss forgilcness lron lhe petspociiveofScnd*oPpresion bu!mvanalvsis is poiciially Ilpplhable ro qusrions of fotgivenes in rchtion roothq rorms olinjusricc. For di$u$ion! oi fotSiveness in nce relalions, pletsc sc Howard Mccarv. Forgivencss and Slawry (Mcca.y and Lnwen t992J. Sea ^tso Akne'n nt dad foBi'.nes: A N.v Mdtet lt ald.t R.,r'.rn,r by Roy Btmtis (2004). A clNric discosion of loBivcness i. fte cotrte( or goup ar@ity rmlins Simn vieseirhal s fid St/t/,4'"' ( 199?) I I Pradici.g ImrErfccr Forgireness 201 2. While I ad lrrgely crirical of Murpht s approach Io forgivenesr, the crution that he and Brudholmenploy-and$eirdeienseoi untorgiveness andlcscnrmenl-isanimponanrand rimely rcsponsc lo 6c lbrgiveness mania rhat swcpt academiu, following the Sourh Alrican Trurh and Reconoiliilion Commission (Muryhy 200], Brudholn 2008) Maphy aid thos qho lgrc wilh hirn slc lhenrsclles as a acting not de possibiljly oi lbrgiveness btrt the drJ,,i/rn,, or thc cxpocl6lion oI forgiveness. 3. For fudhe! .ddcal di$u$ion of care and o$$ feninine' !in!es, sce Sarah Hoagland s Lsbidn Ethi6: Vword N.t v.i!.s ( 1988) and also Fnedmai and Ci!d\ cirical discr$ions in tuei.. a"d C.t (Hetd t J. 4. Inrcrcsringly. Exline observcs rhat whcn nen e encoudg€d lo engge eqDrheticalty *ilh the wrcngdq (by rem.mbering sinilr offcNcs of lhcir own), lhc gc.der gap dnatpeffi: lhe gendercd difcrcncc in fdgiling energes frcn diflering lscls of e,hp.lhy. woNr. who wre mrc lilcly ro€rprc$ empa$y frcm lhe bcgiiDiig, did nor exp.ricnc. ao i.cras in Iorgiline bcha!ior when prompled ro rhinkof$ci.own pa(offenccsi ifanything, &ey were likely robc heshcr hence rhe disappearance ol rnc gcndc!gap. 5. ForadisDssion ofwoilen and anger, pleasc se Bell. Angc., Villue and Oppre$ion'in thh 6. I would be remis$ iD makinF rhis claim if I did nor acknowlcdgc that while I descibe rhe na.jodry of nriisrca phibsophical qrnings or forgivcnc$, thcr.6E notable often ien inistJxcoplions lolhistend. includingJoan Hampton, Claudia Cald and Mdgarel Walker 7. Dmitry is caughr in a rotuous and complicated love rianglc wirh Crush€rki and his onetine firncde, Kalc.ina. Hc is ils on trial for nurdering his tutho. I anr nor o specialisr in Dostolevsky o. Ru$ian lilenlore, and I do notprcte.d to offcr an ruftoritrlive inrerprcrarion of this panicul& pa$ag. in ns lnenry comext What inrercned ft whcn I liFt @d rhis pas sage. howevc( was how instNntlJ intuna,j.ne aul alio pktusibL. n Mi. Thc pictur prescfled of how womcn lod mcn foBive one anorhd or .clatc ro cacn oficr mrc genqally is not inconsi$e wilh rhe narnlives efleded ao Euro Amqican popllar psycholosy, self-helD boots md womcn s magaziRs. and elen in de cx,nples and rhorghr.experih.oK found i. analytic philosophy on forgircness. 8. That lorgilcncs mdy lcqoirc de.eplion is nor always hcld as a srrikc rg.inst it. Jean Bcthke Ehhtain d$clibcs foryivenes as (vinuols) willcd rorgdting and Julid Driverinclrdes ror silcncs among r class oi linues she calls 'vinues of isnoranoe' (Driv* 2001, Elshrain 2001). Since I cannor actually bc ignoent of Bhrt n is I am toryiving, il I dm lo forgile i! rhe ignorlncc invollcd h inGntional. 9. Thc irony ofchoosing lhis passogc docs not escape ne: having advocated torNomen's loices inphilosophicrlffgumcnr,I turn nos ro a maleaudor, whose ficlionalmalechatucrer leclues another male on gcndc! politics. thDugh a senes of sweepiiS and misogynislic generaliations. In onc way. I se mrself as uncoredig rh€ Gilenccd) fcmalc voiccs in D6blelsky bur rhis could al$ be a r.,trri,, dd drr"./"D of rhc m.d I dcscribc in rhe m.i.srtun philosphiol liteouE on lorgivenes. l0Nieushe describrs thc ardic ideat (rhe sysbn ol vilues deared by u.rj.nrtadtri in emn a one ,,/.c edudile charn, r touch ot n rbil"a" io hn ncsh. rhc aneelic look of a plump p€uy aninal (196?.9?). Ar vmious poiits in his w.iriigs, Nictzsche cn s vomen as likely to espousc (and benefit irom).culrure of rers.n,tr.,r. ll. It is intefsting to notc thot the definnion of forgiveness !s olercoming resemnenr', nBr m.de lamous by MuThy anddominant in de philosophicdllitcraturc for some rimc, is actu dlly brsed on d lcxtralsisreading. Murphy claims fiat hc'Iollowt Bishop Builol in hh definnion ( 1988, 9)i jn lhcl. Joseph Budert sermon s on rescntmcnr and fo.gileness allow thatforgivcnels iscompaliblc vith a modcrate levelolresenlmenr, Forgiving hcanscurbing exce$ile esentncnr, and limiting one s angr! p*ceprions ro what tn! good peson, disint.esred in rhe casc, miShr lcel aboul the wrong (Burlc! 1949. 143). Tnis dclinnion s obli ously amenrblc to. linue-eftical analysis. From a fcminist ccriti.al persp.ctive, howovc.. the quesrion r€mains: who is lhe nindard for the good disiokrcsted individnal? Denn ?02 ing rnger ii remsof a disintresred individurl suggesB thar $e individull i.rcrcsls ol thc resen€r cainor themseNes function.s a aananr ior heremotions. lfthc wrone or injustic€ is nol yer recogni4d by her moral comnrunity (e!e. ihe orheNise good rnd disinterested nrenb€ts oiir) hoqevei rhcn her.nger is not only illegnimalei il h illegible.I sec lhis as a kindoi monl failuF described bt CheshieCalhoun(1999. 89) 12. Anca Che.us alsodiscussed rhc value olambilaleni forgilenes (Gheals 2009). 13. Al the risk oflallilg inlo tho rap ofelyingon lypical exafrples ofwiles fo€ivine iusbands, I was Eminded of this point folloeing forner New York Covernor Elioi Spitdis prostiturion scandal, apology rnd evenrual resignarion. At the time,lhere was a gre.t deql ofhedir arcntiononlhc'ev€r-fo.eiving'polilical spous or more accurately. political wife. When I enecl on th€ siluaton facing suddenly fanous polilic.l wives like Silda WallSpitz€ro. Clinron or Dina Mccreevey (whos husband, lomer New Jo6cy Gove.nor J.nes Mcoeevey resigned lfter confe$ing ro an affln with a male co-worker), il seems lo me thr! $ere exisls such an expecurion ofat 1e.$ tdlic forgilencs, any spouse who reiused to lorgive world mako a powerful, elen shocking, stalemcnl References Ansrurz, M.R. 2005. Ir? H..lntt .t Natbns. Th. Pk tie at'd Li li5 of Politicdl &ttioe:s (Lanhrm, MD: Rownln and Little6eld). Arcndt H. 1958, The Hu 1a c.trdtn,r. 2nd ed (Chicago: Univelsily of Chicago Press). Alisrotle. 1999. Nicahdthe.n Ethics. Trans. r hwin. znd ed (lndianapolis: Hrckett BeD!, P 1996. Forgiveies and Loyally.' P/',hr.,r/i' 7 I : 369 381. B€nnelr,C.2002. The varieties ofRetribulivc Expcrience I/P Phik^oph iLal Qua tt b521201): 145-163. Bish., R. er al. 2002. ,Crrst., W,,en 1698-1917:Lv.rience and Erpksk,l, an Atuld.8, of Jo,E.r (Bloominglon: lnditna Universily Press). Boleyn-Fitzgenld. P 2002. Whar Should Fo.givenes Medn? Jburnal of Value hquit-\36(4): 433-493 Boss,l.A.199?. Th.osing PearlstotheSwine Wonen, Foigiveness and the UnrePonlanr Ahuscr,' Phikeothinl Pe$?ecliv.s or P.||er drd D.thnution. Fn. L. Kaplrn (Amsterdan: Rodopi): 235-241. Briq.i S I999 lhes of Nhadle in the Altermath of Violence ln O, F?aDist Dhi.s a .l P.li. rnT Ed. C. Card (Lawrence, Kdss: unile6ny ol Kansrs Pre$):200 225. Brooks. R. 200a. ,4t r,cd and tursiven.s:: A Ne|| Mo.lel lt Bkt k Reparalr,a t.ae eter: University of California Pres). Bludholm, t 2008. R"re"tn.?t\ Vnhe: kan A,re4' ah'l I'e R./,s./ ,) F,r8tv€. (Philadelphia: Temple Univesiry Press), Butler.J. 1949. /5S?/,norrPsacheda!the Rallt Clnpk r and a Drsertatiul Upo lteNatut?ol Vtrr,. Ed. WR. Malfevs (London: G, B€lland SonsLtd.). C.lhoun. C. 1999. Moral F3ilu t., ln Fetn nttu E lid dnd tun it.r. Ed. C. Card ( Lawrencs, Kan s: Unile6ny of Kansss Pres):81 99. Canrpbcll. S. 1994. Being Dismissed: The Pohics of Emotional Expresion. t)tdrm 9 (r): 4e65. Ctil,C.1996.The Unittut1l Loren: Charatter and Ll.ral L,.* (Philadelphi!: Tenplc Unilcr C^t1. C.2OQ2. The AttuLil! Paradistn: A ThfurJ tf EriL \O\tord: Oxford Uniledirl Pe$). Coledan, PW 1998. The Pocess of Forgivenoss in Marilge .nd the Fanrily . trlt/r,rn8 fi,Btvcnsrr. E ls. R.D. Enright and J. No'rh (Madison: Unilesi(y of Wisconsin P!c$)r 75 94. Donoyersky, F 1958. Lrp 8uthe6 Kd4na?.v vol.ll.'f?ns. D. Magrshack (London: Penguin I I Praclicing I n periec t Forgivene $ 20 Downie,R.S I965. 'Fo.given€ss. Phirx.thnal Qudne rl! 15t 128-134. Drilei,.l. 2001. U,paq vid?s (Cambridlc: Cambridge Unilesily Pre$) Elshtain, J.S.2001. Politics and Forgivenesi. arrytt8 7r? Pan. Ed N aiggar (Washington Georgetown Uiilesity Prc$): 42-56. Exline, J. etal.2008.'NotSo linoenl: Does SeeingOne\ owncapability lor wrongdoing Pie dicl Forgive.es? Jd.ndl o/ Pa Eatnli.J and Sotial Pstcholag 94 (3):295_315 Flanigan. B. I999. &/ai!i/.3 lh? U,,&Bi'drl.(New Yolkr MacMillai). Gherus, A.2009. 'ls Uncondilioml Forgivene$ EverJust? li,rits itt Fennlnt Phil*.PhrolReh 8t),. Ed. P.S. Ande&n(New York:Spriigo.). Gnswold, C2007. Foryieawsr: A Phil.^o?hi.aL ErrL/,a1bn t.Canbidge: Crmbridge Unilêir Haaken, .,. 2002. The Cood. the Bad and the Ugly: Psychoa.llytic and Cuhuml Pc6pec lives on Forgilene$.' Belore trryivinS: Cautu ory Vk\rs tf For|iwn.s it1 PsJchotherat) Eds. S. LndbandJ. N{uryhy {Oxiord: oxrord Unive6iry Prc$) Hlber, J. 1991. f,rsten.trr,{ Phik\o7hiul studr &xnhan, MD: Rownan and Litrlefield). Habcr, J. 1998. 'Forgilenes and Femi.ism. t ms .d val ues: Esnls .n ttle w)rk .t visini tsld Ed-J. Haber(Lanham, MD: Rownan andLitde6eld): l4l-150. Held, V, Ed. 1995. ./kn(e .,/ care: Erential Readinqs k Fen rrisr E/lnJ (New York: wesiliet Hi€rcnyni,P20OlArliculating an Uncompromising Forgi!eness. Phil.MPl, and Phenoneno tosicat R6ea reh 62 (3). 529-55s. rroagrand, s. 1988. terbiar thi6:hwa,l Nee vaLue (Pata Alro: iis ute ol Lesbian Sudi€t. Holmsren. 14. 1991. Forgiveness ard te Inlrinsic Value ot Petsans. At eri.4a Phildophict Sudflent 3t) (4): 34t-352Kolnai. A, 1973, Forgivene$.' Ptu&dilgs of the Arnkrelid" t,.iell ?4: 9 l_ 106 Kuuinski, M.J. 1998. The Viltue oi Foryivenes rs a Hunan Resource Mrnagehe Stralegy J.lnaL of Busin5s Ethi.s t 7 ())t 11 85. tanb, S,2002. 'Women, Abuse !.d Foryiveness: A SpecialCte. Befite FtiSirinS: Cautn,nr Vie|9s of fo/Sivenes in Psrtharl'€mp). Eds, S. Lamb.nd J. MuPhy (Oxford:Oxford Uniler s'ty Pres); 155-171. McGary H. 1992. Forgilenes and Slalery. Aztueen Slate,J ar.l Ffted.k: PhiLotupb a ,4mr.a, S/overy, Eds. H, McCaryand B E. Lawson (Bl@minglon: lndiana Univerity Pie$l 90 t t2.. Meter. L.R.2000. Forgiveness and Pubiic Ttusl. Ii)dna,n U/D@raw27(1801):1515 1540. Mills, C.w 2004. " ldeal Theory" rs ldeology. ln M?ral Pry.l.1.9!: lininitl BhitsandSa.n Ihc,,r. Eds. M. walker dnd P DesAureh {Lanhdn, MD: Rowai & Litrleneld)r 163l8l . Minou M. 1998. B4,a.r vc"eea re and foryireres: Facing HnbrJ afretaebcide and Ltas YtL'ce. (Bosto.l Beacon Pres). Muehy. J.C.2003. Cari,s tven: Forybeh*s drtl its Linits t.Orfod: OxfordUnivcuity Plsr. Muryhy, J.C. dd JHanpton, 1988. F.iqiwnes and lle fty (Cambridge: Cambridge Unive6il Nietzsche. F 1967.ll. C.realo$,trr,rdb. Tmis. w. Klurmann (New York: viilage B@kt. Norrock. K.20og(Forlhcoming. Forsiwn*t.frun o Fetuiinr Pdrs,,e.ri'? (New Yorki Lexingto Novnz. D. 1998. Forgiveie$ and Sell-Resped. PhiltMth! and Phena'nenological ResedL 58(2)1299 315. O Shalghnessy. R.J. 196T. Forgivcnc$, Plillx,,,/U 42: 336 352. Pouer, N.2001. ls Rcfusing to Foryive. vice? F€,nrt,dls D,h8 Edi.r. Eds. P DesAuElsan J. waugh (Lanhdn. MD: Rowan & Litnefrdd)r l15-150. Quinn, C.VA. 2001. On The virrue of tror Forsiring:when withholdins Fo€ilen*s is Monll Pni,s.Ndlhy. lnknatbnaL laun\t of Applied Phiknopht t8 (2):219129. P.awts. 1. t981 . A Theary ol Judcd. 2nd ed. (Cambidee: Haruard Universily Press. Roberrs. R.C. r 995. ForAiling rcss. Auerican PhittxophiLal Qud,1e rLr 12 (4): 289 303. 204 Roick, M.2008.'The Kine. His Bdons, and the Vinue ofMagnanimny: Foryilenes as a Polil_ icdl Strrte$/ in Angonew Naples (1442 1495).'Pap Dr€s.nt d rt h'Eivness: Pmbnqthe Boundari.s (Fnn Cbbat confer.,."). Salzbule. seieca. 1995. 'On Mercy.' M, rdt and tuliticdt Essalr. Eds. !.MCoop3r and J F Piocopd (Cam bidg€r Cambridge Unive6ily Pro$): I I9-180. Shriver, D.w 1995Ar Erlrorr Ene ies: Foteive{.ii it hlni.s (New York: Oxrord Uniletsity srawsoi, P 1993, 'Freedon and Resentmenl.' Perst)ediws h MonL Res4nsibililr' Eds J.['1. Fieherand M. RNizz! (hhaca; Comell Univeisiry Pre$)r45-66. Thoreson, C., A.H.S. Haris lnd e Luskin.2000. Forgivene$ aid Health: An Unanswered Ques rion.' Foryn'enes: Th.ao', Reseatch, and Pra.liz. Eds. M.E. Mccullolgh, K l Parganent and C.E. Thoresoi (New York: Cui lford): 25,t-280. Tousaint,L. andJ.R. webb. 2005. 'Gender Dilieiences in the R€larionship Between Empathv and Forsileno$.' I/p J,!,dlofto.ial Pry.t,i,8/ 145 (6):673 685. 'tn$, D. 1999. N. Future With,rr Fo4iv,ncs (Ne* York Doubkday). walk€', M.U.2006. M,ralRer2an: RecotL ruclrlS Mar.lRelalia!\ alier wtung.lorts(Ctnbtidsel Crmbridge Unilctsity Press). weldon, F. 1988. f?bal, Fri?ndr (ChicagorAcadonry Chicago Publishes). Wiesnthal, S, 199?. 1r. J!,tl o\|er: On the P.,ssibilili.s antl ainirt r,/ F,rytv.trcts 2nd Ed (New York: S.h..ken Books). Chapter 12 Feminist Political Solidarity Sally J. Scholz Abstract This anicle examincs some oflhe conceptual hisrory ol collective polilical action within timinisr movements beginning wirh sis{erhood and moving lo teminist political solidarny. I argue that feminist polhical solidarity is built on a commitmenr by individuals !o forn a unity in opposirion kr iniustice or opp.ession. Thrce moral relalions emerge from this understanding offeminisl political solidar ity: the relation to fie cause, the relation among members of Lhe solidary group, and the relation between the solidary group and the largcr sociely. These relations evoke cerlain obligations and responsibilities which I prescnt and defend. Feminisr political solidarily is informed by the pa(icula ties ofihe cause and thus any theoretical accouniofthe moral obligations is necessarily limited, bur by lookingarihese three relations together with a sociol€ical account of transnational feminist political solidarity drawn from Clarc webeas sociological descriplion of the women's Empowerment Proiect, a clearcr picture of some of the moral requiremcnK of a commi(menl ro leminist political soUdarily emerges. Keywords Politicalsolidarity MuLualiry Activism.socialcriticism Coalitions One of the primary inlerests of feminists is developing strategies for collective aclion to bring aboul social change. In this article I brie8y examine some of the history of the call Lo solidarity wilbin feminist movemcnts wilh the aim ofhighlighling three primary molal relarions thar emerge f.on feminist political solidarity. Polilical solida.ily is built on a mutually undertaken collectile commitment to a cause in opposition to perccived injuslice. As such, three moral relalions suggesl themselves:1he relation to thc cause. the relalion among members ofthe solidary group, and the relation between lire solidary group and rhc larger society.In my book, Poliricdl Solidddrr,I offer an extensive discussion of thcsc relaiions and their incumbenl duties as I develop a theory ofpolitical solida.iry. He.e.I explore feminisr polilical solidarny as an inslance or applicat;on of that fiamework. Any given inslance of Philosophy Depanmeit. Villanova University, Villanou, PA 19085, USA e-maii: sally.scholz@rillano!..edu